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YOU CHEATED, YOU LIED: THE SAFE
HARBOR AGREEMENT AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION
Robert R. Schriver*
INTRODUCTION
In May 1999, officials from the Spanish Data Protection Authority
carried out an inspection of Microsoft's subsidiary in Spain.' The
Authority found that Microsoft possessed a database filled with the
personal information of their Spanish consumers.2 In July 2000, the
Authority charged Microsoft with improperly storing and handling
personal data.' Microsoft was convicted and assessed a fine of fifty
million pesetas (approximately $250,000), which was later reduced to
ten million pesetas ($57,000).5
Microsoft was one of the first American businesses to feel the
effects of new European Union laws concerning data protection. The
European Union's6 Directive on Data Protection had gone into effect
on October 25, 1998.' Few outside of the European Union ("EU")
* J.D. Candidate, 2003 Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Joel R. Reidenberg for his guidance in selecting a proper Note topic,
Professor Steve Thel for his input, and Professor Robert Clark of University College
Dublin for introducing me to the topic during the summer of 2001.
1. Christopher Kuner, Beyond Safe Harbor: European Data Protection Law and
Electronic Commerce, 35 Int'l Law. 79,84 (2001).
2 Id.
3. Id. Specifically, Microsoft improperly collected data from its European
employees. See HRIS Data Protection: Concerns Slow Adoption of the European
Union's Safe Harbor Directive, Managing HR Information Systems, May 2001, at 3
[hereinafter HRIS Data Protection].
4. Kuner, supra note 1, at 84.
5. Id.
6. In the interests of clarity and consistency, this Note will use the term
"European Union" throughout to refer to both the former European Economic
Community and the European Union that came into existence after the Treaty on
European Union, signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992. The Member States of
the European Union are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland. France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. See The Member States of the European Union, at
http'//europa.eu.int/abc/eumembersindexen.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2002).
7. See Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
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took notice, and fewer still anticipated the consternation, argument,
posturing, proselytizing, and theorizing it would cause. It soon
became apparent that the Directive would change the face of privacy
protection not only in Europe, but also in the United States and the
rest of the world.
The Directive was passed in response to growing concerns about
the improper use, collection, and dissemination of personal
information. In Europe, privacy is "not a subject you can bargain
about" 8-it is considered a fundamental human right.9 The Directive
was passed in order to harmonize the various privacy laws10 that had
been enacted throughout the Member States of the European
Union.1' The Directive has come to have particular importance in the
area of e-commerce, as the Internet has allowed personal data to be
easily-and secretly-collected and sold."2
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L
821) 31 [hereinafter Data Privacy Directive], http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/enlif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.html.
8. Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and
International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 Yale J. Int'l L.
1, 19 (2000) (quoting Spiros Simitis, former Data Protection Commissioner in
Germany).
9. See Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15
Berkeley Tech L.J. 461, 466 (2000); Graham Pearce & Nicholas Platten, Orchestrating
Transatlantic Approaches to Personal Data Protection: A European Perspective, 22
Fordham Int'l L.J. 2024,2026 (1999); Shaffer, supra note 8, at 18; Christopher Wolf &
Michael C. Hochman, Important New Rules For Online Privacy: Regulations Protect
Children and "Safe Harbors" Proposed to Cover Collection of Personal Information,
The Metropolitan Corp. Couns., July 2000, at 10.
10. See infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
11. Directives are passed by the European Council to harmonize divergent
national laws of Member States on a particular topic or area. "Directives require
implementation at [the] national level... Member states are not free to enact or
maintain domestic measures inconsistent with their obligations under the Directive."
Josephine Steiner & Lorna Woods, Textbook on EC Law 150 (5th ed. 1996). If the
law of a Member State conflicts with the provisions of a Directive, the provisions of a
Directive prevail. Id.; see also infra note 66 and accompanying text. The EU
developed the Directive "to avoid the complex [sic] and burden of having 15 different
national privacy laws." The EU Data Protection Directive: Implications for the U.S.
Privacy Debate: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 43 (2001)
[hereinafter Safe Harbor Hearings] (testimony of David Aaron),
http://energycommerce.house.gov/lO7/hearings/03082001Hearing49/hearing.htm.
12. See U.S.-EU "Safe Harbor" Data Privacy Arrangement, in Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 156, 156
(Sean D. Murphy ed., 2001) [hereinafter "Safe Harbor" Arrangement] (stating that
the Directive was passed "in recognition of the ease with which personal data on
Europeans can be transferred electronically"). The Safe Harbor agreement (an
agreement reached between the United States and the EU after the Directive was
passed) applies to online and offline collection and processing of personal data, as
long as it has been "recorded in any form." See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor
Principles, July 21, 2000 [hereinafter Safe Harbor Principals], at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm. The FTC, of course,
can regulate both online and offline deceptive trade practices, but in recent years
2778 [Vol. 70
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It is perhaps no surprise that the United States views privacy rights
quite differently than the European Union. Americans and
Europeans think of privacy in "fundamentally different ways."' 3 For
the United States to adopt the European regulatory approach would
be a "jarring change" from the current privacy regime." Most
American companies simply do not see privacy as a normal cost of
doing business.15 They reject international privacy standards and have
a basic "distaste for legislation." 6 For its part, the U.S. Congress has
passed no overarching privacy law; explanations for this have ranged
from First Amendment concerns" and the free flow of information to
the promotion of commerce and wealth, to "a healthy distrust for
governmental solutions."'" As one commentator pointedly put it:
"Congress has granted drug abusers greater privacy protection than
lawful users of the Internet."'9 This distrust, however, does not seem
to extend to the general, Internet-using public. In its 2000 report to
Congress, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") found that ninety-
two percent of respondents did not trust even privacy policies posted
on companies' websites, and eighty-two percent recommended
legislation to change the situation.0
And the situation is changing. Piece by piece, American consumers
(and Internet users in particular) have been gaining privacy
protections.21  Additionally, the European Directive may prove
impossible to ignore. The trade in personal information between the
United States and the EU was valued at $120 billion in 2000.2 As this
have focused on deceptive practices in the online world, see infra notes 197-302, and it
is in the online context that the Directive and the Safe Harbor agreement are usually
discussed.
13. Fromholz, supra note 9, at 470. The terms used by Americans and Europeans
"reflect[] this deep disparity: Americans tend to use the term 'privacy.' while
Europeans discuss 'data protection."' Id.
14. Id.
15. Tamara Loomis, A Few Companies Have Complied with EU Law, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 30,2001, at 5.
16. Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2047-48.
17. For a discussion of the conflicts between a free press, the Directive, the Safe
Harbor agreement, and the First Amendment, see Jane E. Kirtley, Privacy and the
Press in the New Millennium How International Standards Are Driving the Privacy
Debate in the United States and Abroad, 23 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 69 (2000).
18. James M. Assey, Jr. & Demetrios A. Eleftheriou, The EU-U.S. Privacy Safe
Harbor: Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters?. 9 CommLaw Conspectus: J. Comm. L
& Pol'y 145, 150 (2001).
19. Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 Hous. L
Rev. 717,725-26 (2001).
20. FTC, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
Marketplace 2 (May 2000) [hereinafter 2000 FTC Privacy Report],
http:llwww.ftc.gov/reportslprivacy2000/privacy2OOOtext.pdf.
21. See infra notes 171-97 and accompanying text.
22. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, International Privacy: Safe Harbor
Protection for Personal Data, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 10, 2000, at 3.
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Note will demonstrate,23 the Directive places virtually this entire trade
at risk.24 U.S. firms doing business in Europe could be just as
constrained. U.S. companies have approximately nine million
employees in the EU,1 and in 1995, "U.S. affiliates in Europe
produced $1.2 trillion of goods and services. 12 6 These affiliates also
fall under the Directive's purview, and few abide by European privacy
standards.27
The potential for trade disruption is grand. In 1997, for example,
U.S. sales via direct marketing (which thrives on the unrestrained
trade of personal data) were $1.2 trillion, while such sales were only
$125 billion in the European Union, which has a larger population.2
European privacy standards may have something to do with that.
U.S. companies subject to the Directive, it has been said, risk
"astronomical" losses if they simply ignore the regulations and have
their data flows shut off by the EU. 9
The Clinton administration recognized the threat and began
negotiating with the European Commission shortly after the Directive
went into effect. The result was the Safe Harbor agreement, which
was approved in July 2000.30 Under the Safe Harbor agreement, U.S.
firms agree to abide by basic privacy principles similar to those
contained in the European Directive on Data Protection.3 1 Those that
do so will be presumed to provide "adequate protection," and the
European data-protection authorities will allow their transatlantic
data transfers to continue unchallenged.3  Europe fears the
agreement might be too lenient, especially concerning enforcement.33
U.S. companies fear the agreement might be too strict.34
23. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
24. Kuner, supra note 1, at 82 (stating that almost "all types of data and
processing are covered by EU data protection law").
25. See Barbara Crutchfield George et al., U.S. Multinational Employers:
Navigating through the "Safe Harbor" Principles to Comply with the EU Data Privacy
Directive, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 735, 738 (2001).
26. Shaffer, supra note 8, at 39.
27. Julia Brunts, EU Data Privacy Rules Loom for U.S. Multinationals, Chi. Daily
L. Bull., Nov. 29,2001, at 1.
28. Shaffer, supra note 8, at 18.
29. Marie Clear, Comment, Falling into the Gap: The European Union's Data
Protection Act and Its Impact on U.S. Law and Commerce, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer
& Info. L. 981, 989 (2000).
30. See Safe Harbor agreement, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor (last visited
Mar. 22, 2002).
31. Compare the principles of the Data Privacy Directive, infra text accompanying
notes 67-71, and the Safe Harbor principles, infra text accompanying notes 129-35.
32. See Midge M. Hyman & Sandra N. S. Covington, European Privacy and the
Safe Harbor, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 30, 2001, at s6 ("By voluntarily certifying adherence to
the Safe Harbor principles.., an organization is deemed compliant with EU privacy
standards and may freely engage in the transfer of personal information from EU
member states.").
33. See, e.g., Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2048 ("From a European
perspective, the key weakness of the U.S. model lies in its.., still half-hearted
2780 [Vol. 70
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Accordingly, U.S. reaction to the Safe Harbor was tepid." But with
lessons such as those learned by Microsoft, the Safe Harbor may yet
become an important part of many corporations' business plans. In
2000, "lack of consumer trust cost e-businesses $16 billion in lost
sales. 36 Those are numbers e-commerce cannot afford to ignore.
The added threat of data-flow shutoffs from Europe makes the Safe
Harbor an increasingly attractive option.
But what if someone cheats? What if a company lies to the U.S.
and EU authorities and says it is compliant when it is not? How will
the agreement be enforced? Opinions about the validity-and
necessity-of the Safe Harbor itself have varied widely.-' This Note
will attempt to steer clear of tempestuous policy arguments,- and
focus instead on the enforcement of the Safe Harbor, in particular, on
the role of the FTC, the agreement's principal governmental
enforcement body. What would an enforcement action look like? Is
the FTC up to the task? Does it even have the legal ability to bring an
enforcement action on behalf of foreign consumers? Finally, are there
ways of augmenting the FTC's enforcement powers to create more
effective privacy protection?
This Note argues that the FTC is willing and able to enforce the
Safe Harbor agreement through its power to prohibit deceptive trade
practices under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
("FTCA"). Part I of this Note will give a brief history of the Safe
Harbor agreement, beginning with the history of the enactment of the
Directive by the European Union, 9 and continuing with a description
of the Safe Harbor negotiations and eventual agreement.' This part
will then examine existing privacy protections in the United States,
beginning with an examination of federal legislation protecting
privacy rights,41 and continuing with a review of the FTC's efforts in
the past few years fighting for greater privacy protection for American
consumers.42 Finally, this part will examine the legal actions the FTC
approach to enforcement.").
34. See, e.g., Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 18, at 158 ("[Tlhe Safe Harbor's
critics have grown louder, arguing that compliance with the existing Safe Harbor rules
would be costly, unworkable and unfair...."); Wolf & Hochman. supra note 9, at 10
("Many domestic e-commerce participants were not prepared to comply with the
strident EU policy.").
35. See generally infra notes 151-70 and accompanying text.
36. Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 45 (statement of David L Aaron).
37. See generally infra notes 155-70, 314-25 and accompanying text.
38. For a sampling of opinions that effectively summarize the various policy
arguments for and against the Safe Harbor agreement, see Safe Harbor Hearings,
supra note 11.
39. See infra notes 48-102 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 103-70 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 171-97 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 198-230 and accompanying text.
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has taken pursuant to its section 5 powers to prohibit deceptive
practices by online companies.43
Part II of this Note will examine criticisms of the Safe Harbor
agreement, in particular the recent challenges to the effectiveness and
validity of IFTC enforcement. 44
Part III of this Note will discuss what an FTC action undertaken to
enforce the Safe Harbor would look like. It will argue that the FTC is
well-suited to enforce the Safe Harbor, and that rulemaking under the
FTCA is necessary to clarify the FTC's legal authority to enforce the
Safe Harbor.45 This part will propose that the FTC enact a rule
pursuant to its powers under section 18 of the FTCA to define as a
deceptive trade practice an institution's failure to abide by its
obligations under the Safe Harbor agreement.46  This part will
conclude by arguing that federal legislation is the only way to ensure
absolutely that the FTC will be able to prosecute the cheaters and
liars mentioned in the title, who conceal their noncompliance with the
Safe Harbor to gain an unfair economic advantage.47
I. HISTORY OF THE SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENT
A. Privacy Legislation in Europe
1. Privacy Legislation Before the 1998 Directive
Europe was the scene of the first data-protection statute, enacted by
the German state of Hesse in 1970.48 Sweden enacted the first
national privacy legislation in 1973.49 In 1978, France passed its
charmingly named Law Concerning Data Processing, Files, and
Liberty, which granted individuals some measure of privacy
protection. These early privacy statutes were a response to a privacy
movement in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s.11
The first attempt to articulate a broad set of basic privacy principles
was made by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
43. See infra notes 231-313 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 314-37 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 338-98 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 399-401 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 402-04 and accompanying text.
48. Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 18, at 149; Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face
of Privacy Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33 Ind. L. Rev.
173, 180 n.34 (1999).
49. Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 18, at 149; Cate, supra note 48, at 180.
50. Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 18, at 149.
51. Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 771, 782 (1999); see also Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at
33 (testimony of Stefano RodotA) ("Europe accepted the modern idea of privacy
protection coming from the United States.").
2782 [Vol. 70
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Development ("OECD"). 2  The OECD passed its non-binding
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data in 1980.53 The OECD Guidelines were intended to be
a model that various countries could use to enact legislation to
facilitate the free flow of information between them without running
afoul of each other's privacy regulations.' They called for adherence
to "eight basic principles that govern the handling of personal
information. 5 5  As such, it was an early, non-binding attempt at
harmonization of European privacy legislation. The United States
endorsed the Guidelines, but did not pass any legislation
implementing them. 6
The European Union officially got into the act in 1981, when the
Council of Europe promulgated a Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.
Its provisions were similar to the OECD Guidelines.' The European
Union continued to work on a Union-wide Directive to harmonize the
various privacy laws of its Member States and to further the aims of
the Common Market.5 9 It was negotiated "within the context of the
threat of data transfer bans from certain EU Member States with
protective data privacy laws (such as France and Germany) to other
EU Member States with less stringent laws (such as Italy)."' The
European Commission produced the first draft of the Directive in July
52. See The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/PRIV-EN.HTM (last modified Jan. 5, 1999).
The OECD is an organization of thirty countries that releases publications and
statistical studies on economic and social issues. The Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, About OECD, at http://www.oecd.orgloecd/pagesi
home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-about-0-nodirectorate-no-no-no-0,FF.htmi (last
visited Mar. 12,2002).
53. Jordan M. Blanke, "Safe Harbor" and the European Union's Directive on Data
Protection, 11 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 57, 59 (2000): Cate, supra note 48, at 180;
Fromholz, supra note 9, at 466.
54. Cate, supra note 48, at 180.
55. Julia Gladstone, The U.S. Privacy Balance and the European Privacy
Directive: Reflections on the United States Privacy Policy, 7 Willamette J. Int'l L &
Disp. Resol. 10, 17 (2000). The eight principles are: "'Collection Limitation, Data
Quality, Purpose, Specification, Use Limitation, Security Safeguards, Openness,
Individual Participation, and Accountability." Id.
56. Anna Shimanek, Note, Do You Want Milk with Those Cookies?: Complying
with the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 26 Iowa J. Corp. L 455, 463 (2001);
Reidenberg, supra note 51, at 773 (noting that the United States endorsed the OECD
Guidelines).
57. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/enTreatiestHtmlI108.htm.
58. Cate, supra note 48, at 180-81; Fromholz, supra note 9. at 467.
59. Cate, supra note 48, at 181. "By requiring similar data privacy protection
throughout the European Union, the EU Directive concurrently removed the threat
to unhindered data flows between Member States." Shaffer, supra note 8, at 10.
60. Shaffer, supra note 8, at 10.
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1990.61 The European Parliament eliminated the draft's distinction
between the public sector and the private sector and then
"overwhelmingly approved the draft directive" on March 11, 1992.62
2. Passage of the Directive
The European Union adopted the Data Privacy Directive on
October 24, 1995, and it went into effect on October 25, 1998.63 At the
time of its adoption, six Member States had drafted or already passed
data-protection laws. 6' The Directive, like the OECD Guidelines
before it, aimed to allow the "free flow of personal data among"
Member States and to provide a "firewall" against third countries
"who fail to provide adequate protection of privacy rights."6 5
The Directive instructs all Member States to enact laws that
"protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and
in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of
personal data." 6 The core of the Directive is Article 6, which sets
forth the following principles:
A. Personal data shall be "processed fairly and lawfully."'67
B. Personal data shall only be "collected for specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes. '
C. The data must be "adequate, relevant and not excessive in
relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or
further processed." 69
D. The data must be accurate and up to date. Data that are
inaccurate or no longer current are to be "erased or
rectified."7°
E. Data must be "kept in a form which permits identification of
data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the
purposes for which the data were collected or for which they
are further processed." 71
61. See Cate, supra note 48, at 181.
62- Id.
63. See Edmund L. Andrews, European Law Aims to Protect Privacy of Data,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1998, at Al.
64. Id.
65. Raysman & Brown, supra note 22, at 3; see also Data Privacy Directive, supra
note 7, pmbl. at (20) ("[T]he fact that the processing of data is carried out by a person
established in a third country must not stand in the way of the protection of
individuals provided for in this Directive... and there should be guarantees to ensure
that the rights and obligations provided for in this Directive are respected .....
66. Data Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 1.
67. Id. art. 6.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
2784 [Vol. 70
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Article 7 lists the circumstances under which personal data may be
processed,' and Article 8 prohibits the processing of "special
categories of data," such as race, ethnicity, political affiliation, union
membership, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, or medical data,
without "explicit consent."' 3
Implementing the provisions of the Directive can have dramatic
effects in a Member State. Italy, for example, had no data-protection
law before the Directive was passed. 4 In the four years since Italy
passed its law to comply with the Directive, the new Italian Data
Protection Commission has received almost 100,000 consumer
reports.75 Consumers complained about breaches directly to private
companies as well.76
Potentially the most important-and certainly the most
controversial-feature of the Directive is Article 25.1 The European
Union recognized that the easiest way for Member States to avoid the
strictures of the Directive was to simply send their data to a third
country to be processed.7 It was, in fact, a "common practice" for
Member States to send data to countries with little or no data-
protection law to be processed to avoid the rigors of European privacy
laws.' 9 Article 25 therefore prohibits transfer of personal data to a
third country for processing purposes unless that country has been
found to provide an "adequate level" of privacy protection.' The
immediate questions, therefore, were what constituted adequate
protection, and which countries met that standard. The Directive
does not define the term "adequate," but rather establishes a Working
Party of the European Parliament to investigate the privacy laws of
other countries, and to certify them as adequate if found to properly
comply with the Directive.8 At the time the Directive went into
72. Id. art. 7.
73. Id. art. 8.
74. See Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 9 (testimony of Stefano Rodoth).
75. See id.
76. See id. ("4 million customers asked banks not to send them commercial
advertising.").
77. See George et al., supra note 25, at 759.
78. See Data Privacy Directive, supra note 7, pmbl. at (6) ("[Tihe increase in
scientific and technical cooperation and the coordinated introduction of new
telecommunications networks... necessitate and facilitate cross-border flows of
personal data.").
79. Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2027; see also Data Privacy Directive, supra
note 7, pmbl. at (4) ("[F]requent recourse is being had in the Community to the
processing of personal data in the various spheres of economic and social activity...
information technology is making the processing and exchange of such data
considerably easier.").
80. Data Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 25(1). Article 25 was quickly
dubbed "the Great Wall of Europe." Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 13
(statement of Stefano RodotA).
81. Shaffer, supra note 8, at 21; see also Data Privacy Directive, supra note 7, arts.
29-30.
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effect, "the whole world" was considered to be noncompliant. Even
within the European Union, only five Member States had "adequate"
legislation in place.83
3. Reaction to the Directive
The Directive binds all Member States of the European Union to
pass legislation complying with its provisions.84 On January 11, 2000,
however, the European Commission began enforcement proceedings
against Ireland, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands
for failing to comply with the Directive.85  Over a year later,
enforcement proceedings were still pending against all except the
Netherlands,86 and even as late as November 2001, the Commission
found France, Germany, and Luxembourg to be noncompliant. 8
Shortly after the passage of the Directive, the European Union
began discussions with other countries on the adequacy of their data
protection. By April 1999, the EU was negotiating with the United
States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand." One year later, Canada,
Australia, Taiwan, Norway, Iceland, Hong Kong, Poland, Hungary,
and Switzerland all had either implemented privacy legislation or
were in the process of doing so.89 On July 26, 2000, the EU approved
the privacy laws of Switzerland and Hungary, along with the Safe
Harbor agreement, as providing adequate protection." Argentina
82. See Susan Binns, Technical Briefing for Journalists on Data Protection - the
EU/U.S. Dialogue (Dec. 10, 1998), http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/
dataprot/backinfo/euus.htm. Ms. Binns noted that Switzerland already had a
"perfectly good data protection law which looks pretty much like" the EU model, but
because there had not been time to make a formal finding of adequacy, Switzerland at
that point was presumed to be noncompliant. Id.
83. Fromholz, supra note 9, at 467-68.
84. Data Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 32. For an example of Member
State Data Protection Act, see Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 18-23
(statement of David Smith) (describing the provisions of the UK Data Protection Act
1998).
85. Kuner, supra note 1, at 80; Press Release, European Commission, Data
Protection: Commission Takes Five Member States to Court (Jan. 11, 2000),
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/intemal-market/en/media/dataprot/news/2k-10.htm.
86. See Press Release, European Commission, Data Protection: "Junk" E-mAil
Costs Internet Users 10 Billion a Year Worldwide-Commission Study, RAPID (Feb.
2, 2001).
87. See Reidenberg, supra note 19, at 733. But see Safe Harbor Hearings, supra
note 11, at 32 (testimony of Stefano RodotA) ("The fact that they have not
implemented the directive does not mean that they have no data protection. They
have data protection. France and Germany have very well-established ... data
protection laws.").
88. Elizabeth de Bony, EU, United States Edge Toward Data Privacy Accord,
InfoWorld, Apr. 9, 1999, at http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9904/09/
eeuu.priv.idg/index.html.
89. Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2050-51.
90. See Commission Decision 2000/518/EC of July 26, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 1,
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/intemal-market/en/dataprot/adequacy/index.htm
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enacted its privacy law in late 2000,91 and Canada's law went into
effect on January 1, 2001. - Discussions with Japan and Australia
continued through October 2000,91 and were ongoing as of November
2001.94
Reaction in the United States was somewhat muted. American
officials, it was said, agreed in principle about the right to privacy, but
disagreed as to how it should be implemented.95 Europeans generally
thought of U.S. privacy protection as being "over reliant on voluntary
self-regulation," while U.S. businesses thought the European regime
was "unduly heavy handed and bureaucratic."" The method adopted
by the Directive-a "top-down approach"-has not been well-
received in the United States, which has "an entire industry" set up
around the accumulation, collection, and analysis of personal data.'
This industry would be threatened by strict privacy rules, and
American companies fear that American consumers would use
privacy legislation as "a weapon of nuisance making" that would
create enormous costs.98 The Directive, however, did not pass by
(announcing that the Swiss law provides adequate protection); Commission Decision
2000/519/EC of July 26, 2000, 2000 OJ. (L 215) 4,
http://europa.eu.int/comminternal-market/en/dataprot/adequacyiindex.htm
(announcing that the Hungarian law provides adequate protection); Christopher Paul
Boam, The Internet, Information and the Culture of Regulator, Change: A Modern
Renaissance, 9 CommLaw Conspectus: J. Comm. L. & Pol'y 175, 185 (2001).
91. See Tamara Loomis, European Union Safeguards Get Scant Response Here,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30, 2000, at 5 [hereinafter Loomis, Safeguards]. Argentina's law is
described as superior to privacy protection in the United States. See id.
92. Patrick Thibodeau, Canadian Privacy Law Raises Ante, Computer World,
Dec. 4, 2000, http://wvvv.computervorld.com/storyba/0,4125.NAV47-STO54674,00.
html. Canada's privacy law may also cause potential problems for data exchange with
the United States. It does not fully take effect, however, until 2004. See id. In
January 2002, the European Union recognized the Canadian law as providing
adequate protection. See William New, Canadian Privacy Law Receives European
Endorsement, Nat'l J.'s Tech. Daily, Jan. 11, 2002,
93. Raysman & Brown, supra note 22, at 3.
94. See Stephen J. Davidson & Daniel M. Bryant, The Right of Privacy:
International Discord and the Interface with Intellectual Property Law, The Computer
& Internet Law., Nov. 2001, at 1.
95. See Andrews, supra note 63.
96. Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2025.
97. See Andrews, supra note 63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Binns, supra note 82; see also Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 6
(statement of the Hon. W. J. "Billy" Tauzin) (noting potential litigation concerns:
"Europeans do not view lawsuits as an answer to problems. In the U.S., lawsuits are
filed at the drop of a hat."); Blanke, supra note 53, at 85 ("There was much concern
from industry about repetitious or vexatious requests for access."). Complaining
about increased costs, of course, is nothing new, and one commentator has argued
that industry estimates of the costs of privacy legislation are "staggeringly specious."
Reidenberg, supra note 19, at 724. Nor is the complaint unique to the United States:
the British Banking Association claimed that it would cost each major bank more
than £150 per customer to comply with the terms of the Directive. Shaffer, supra note
8, at 17. The European Commission (of course) performed its own study and
"concluded that the financial impact would be minimal." Id. In Italy, "the private
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unnoticed. The possibility that a country would cut off a transatlantic
data transfer had existed in the past under the privacy laws of various
Member States,99 but it was the passage of the Directive that got the
attention of U.S. authorities."° The Clinton administration wanted to
create a "safe harbor" agreement that would satisfy European
concerns about data protection and concerns voiced by American
business about intrusive bureaucracy and increased costs."0' However,
there was no rush to do so-as a contemporary New York Times
article put it, "[i]n the short term, government and industry officials
predict that nothing much will happen."1 2 They were right.
B. The Safe Harbor Agreement
1. Negotiations
In an April 1998 address to U.S. business leaders, John Mogg,
Director General of the European Commission, said of existing
American privacy law: "[M]ost of what we see is not meaningful...
the industry codes we have seen have no teeth."'"3 Something else
was needed, and negotiations were soon underway between Mogg and
David Aaron, U.S. Undersecretary for Commerce, for a bilateral
agreement °4  Mogg and Aaron originally planned to finish
negotiations by December 1998,05 and in fact, the "basic form" of the
agreement "evolved quickly."'" As of April 1999, the two sides were
"edging toward" an agreement, and were said to be "quite close" to
reaching a satisfactory solution."° Negotiations then broke down over
the issues of enforcement and remedy. 8
The fact that only seven out of fifteen Member States had
implemented the Directive reduced the pressure on the two parties.19
One month later, however, the negotiations were in trouble, with
Aaron implying that the EU would not yield on the issue of
sector... [did] not at all suffer[] the dramatic consequences foreseen by some
interested [parties]" after the national privacy law enforcing the Directive went into
effect. Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 9 (testimony of Stefano RodotAt).
99. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
100. Shaffer, supra note 8, at 41.
101. See Andrews, supra note 63.
102. Id.
103. Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2048 (internal quotations omitted).
104. See Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 50 (statement of Jonathan M.
Winer) ("Neither the U.S. nor the EU sought a trade war over privacy."); U.S. Finds
Safe Haven against EU Data Laws, Precision Marketing, Oct. 26, 1998, at 1
(describing negotiations between Mogg and Aaron in October 1998 as "intense").
105. Binns, supra note 82.
106. "Safe Harbor" Arrangement, supra note 12, at 157.
107. de Bony, supra note 88 (internal quotations omitted).
108. Murphy, supra note 12, at 157.
109. See de Bony, supra note 88.
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enforcement. 10 Mogg, however, insisted that "the gap is consistently
narrowing."' Before the new millennium arrived, the United States
had submitted six Safe Harbor drafts to the European Union, which
rejected them all." 2
A preliminary proposal was finally completed on March 14, 2000,
nearly a year and a half after the Directive went into effect."3 The
EU, through Mogg, declared that the preliminary Safe Harbor
proposal did indeed constitute "adequate protection."" 4 American
privacy advocates, for their part, were already calling it "largely
meaningless,""' 5 and some Member States had reservations as well." 6
Although the European Parliament gave the draft proposal a thumbs
down,"7 its rejection was not legally binding, and the Member States
approved the agreement on June 1, 2000."1 The European
Commission formally certified the Safe Harbor agreement as
providing adequate protection on July 26, 2000.111
2. The Safe Harbor Provisions
a. Benefits
The Safe Harbor "provide[s] a streamlined means for U.S.
organizations to comply with the Directive." 12- By signing on to the
agreement, a company certifies to EU customers and organizations
that it provides adequate privacy protection for personal data
110. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S.-European Union Talks on Privacy Are Sputtering,
N.Y. Times, May 27, 1999, at C6. Aaron said that the EU was insisting that the U.S.
"invent a regime that looks like theirs .... Well, we aren't going to do that." Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
111. Id (internal quotations omitted).
112. See Shimanek, supra note 56, at 472.
113. See Jeri Clausing, Europe and U.S. Reach Data Privacy Pact, N.Y. Times, Mar.
15, 2000, at C6.
114. See Rebecca Sykes & Elizabeth de Bony, E.U.-U.S. Privacy Deal Rotten,
Observers Say, InfoWorld, Mar. 14,2000, http'J/www.infoworld.com/articeslenixml/
00/03/141000314enharbor.xml.
115. Id.
116. Margret Johnston, EU Vote on Privacy Agreement Due This Week, IDG.net,
Mar. 27,2000, at www.idg.net/crd-idgsearch_156896.html.
117. Shimanek, supra note 56, at 458.
118. U.S. and Europe Agree on Privacy, N.Y. Times, June 2, 2000, at C4. Aaron
later said that the Commission's decision was passed over "the outright opposition of
the European Parliament." Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11. at 43 (testimony of
David Aaron).
119. Commission Decision 95/46!EC of July 26, 2000, art. 5, 2000 OJ. (L 215) 7,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdflsafeharbour.pdf; Raysman & Brown, supra note
22, at 3.
120. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview [hereinafter Safe Harbor
Overview], at http'//www.export.govlsafeharbor/sh_overview.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2002).
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according to the terms of the Directive.2 1  Such a company's
protections will be "deemed adequate" simply by signing on, and data
transfers to the company will continue uninterrupted.2  If a Member
State requires prior approval of data transfers, the requirement
"either will be waived or approval will be automatically granted" for a
U.S. company in the Safe Harbor." Joining the Safe Harbor also
allows an American company to avoid negotiations with the data-
protection authorities of each Member State in which it does
business."2 4 Signing on is easy, and can be done via the Commerce
Department's website.' 5
b. Requirements
So much for the benefits. What are the requirements?
Membership, it bears stating, is voluntary. 126 Companies that agree to
the Safe Harbor must comply with its requirements, and annually
certify with the Commerce Department that they are in compliance. 12
The company must also indicate in its published privacy policy that it
adheres to the Safe Harbor principles. 128  The principles are as
follows:
Notice-participants must tell individuals why information about
them is being collected and what it is being used for. Participants
must also reveal their contact information, the types of third parties to
which they disclose personal information, and any means by which the
individual can choose to limit the use and disclosure of his
information. 129
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Certifying an Organization's Adherence to the
Safe Harbor, at http:// web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/SHReg.nsf/SafeHarbor?OpenForm
(last visited Mar. 20, 2002) (online certification form); U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Information Required for Safe Harbor Certification, at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh-registration.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2002)
(checklist of information needed to register).
126. See Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 120. A company can "join a self-
regulatory privacy program," such as TRUSTe or BBBonline. Id.; U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Safe Harbor FAQs, FAQ No. 11: Dispute Resolution and Enforcement,
[hereinafter FAQ No. 111, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/FAQ11FINAL.htm
(last visited Nov. 2, 2001). Alternatively, a company can create its own privacy policy
in accordance with the Safe Harbor principles. See Safe Harbor Overview, supra note
120. This Note focuses on the consequences of a company joining the Safe Harbor
and enjoying its benefits (all the while certifying to the Commerce Department and
the European Union that they follow the principles) without in reality providing the
necessary privacy protection. For the purposes of this Note, the way in which a
company chooses to join is irrelevant.
127. See Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 120.
128. See Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 12.
129. See id.
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Choice-participants must allow individuals to choose whether their
personal information will be disclosed to a third party or used for a
purpose other than that for which it was collected.,"
Onward Transfer/Transfer to Third Parties-participants must abide
by the notice and choice principles before disclosing personal
information to a third party.13
Access-individuals must be given access to their personal
information and the ability to correct or delete inaccurate
information.132
Security-participants must take "reasonable precautions" to
ensure the security of any personal information collected. 33
Data Integrity-personal data "must be relevant for the purposes
for which it is to be used," and it must be "accurate, complete, and
current."134
Enforcement-participants must make dispute-resolution
procedures available to individuals, with verification procedures and
remedies that are "sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance."' 35
Thus, the Safe Harbor requirements are similar to, but less onerous
than, those imposed by the Directive." These principles also need
only be observed in business dealings with the EU'--not in dealings
with U.S. customers. But it should also be remembered that signing
up for the Safe Harbor is equivalent to a promise-to the Commerce
Department, the European Union, and European consumers-that a
company will abide by the Safe Harbor's terms. This promise carries
great weight when it comes to enforcement.'-
c. Enforcement
What happens if a company cheats? Enforcement will first be
"carried out primarily by the private sector," which will be "backed up
as needed by government enforcement of... unfair and deceptive
statutes. ' 139 The "private sector enforcement" will be according to
130. Id.
131. See id.
132 Id.
133. Id
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Sykes & de Bony, supra note 114 ("'Those [European] laws are much
stricter than the safe harbor principles .
137. See id.
138. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Enforcement Overview. Federal
and State "Unfair and Deceptive Practices" Authority and Privacy, July 14, 2000, at
http://www.exporLgov/safeharbor/ENFORCEMENTOVERVIEWFINALhtm
[hereinafter Safe Harbor Enforcement Overview] ("[Wjhere a company certifies that
it will safeguard the privacy of information and then fails to do so, such action would
be a misrepresentation and a 'deceptive practice' within the meaning of Section 5.").
139. Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 120.
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whatever dispute-resolution process the participant has put in place in
accordance with the Enforcement Principle. 40  Assuming these
measures fail, enforcement then lies with the FTC, the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"), or the Department of
Transportation ("DOT"), "[d]epending on the industry sector.' 4'
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, "a company's failure [to
comply with the Safe Harbor] might be considered deceptive and
actionable by the Federal Trade Commission.' 142 The FTC may move
to enforce the agreement "even where an organization adhering to the
safe harbor principles relies entirely on self-regulation to provide...
enforcement.' '143 Penalties that may be applied pursuant to the FTCA
are administrative cease-and-desist orders, injunctions and restraining
orders, and fines of up to $12,000 per day."4 Participants who
continuously violate the terms of the agreement will be dropped. 45
3. The Response to the Safe Harbor
After the Safe Harbor was approved by U.S. and European
authorities, a so-called "standstill agreement" went into effect, under
which no enforcement action would be taken by the EU while U.S.
companies registered for and began to comply with the terms of the
Safe Harbor agreement. 46 This agreement was set to expire on July 1,
2001, '4 but an "informal grace period" continued through November
2001.11 To date, Member States have blocked only a few data
transfers,1 49 and the overall European reaction to the Safe Harbor
seems to be muted.150
The American reception was not clamorous, either. Few companies
were interested in the program, and fewer still signed up. By January
2001, six months after the program went into effect, only twelve
140. The enforcement principle establishes only the somewhat nebulous
requirement that participants create a dispute resolution process that is "sufficiently
rigorous to ensure compliance." Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 12.
141. See Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 120. The DOT has jurisdiction over
transportation companies. See id. The FCC has jurisdiction over telecommunications.
See Safe Harbor Enforcement Overview, supra note 138. For brevity's sake, this Note
will only address enforcement by federal authorities, not private dispute resolution,
and only with those companies that fall under the jurisdiction of the FTC.
142. Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 120 (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. See id.; see also Safe Harbor Enforcement Overview, supra note 138.
145. See Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 120.
146. See Dennis Kelly, U.S. Financial Services to Meet With European Union Over
Privacy, BestWire, May 9,2001.
147. Id.
148. Brunts, supra note 27.
149. See Loomis, Safeguards, supra note 91. As of November 2000, France and
Sweden, which have some of the stricter data-protection laws, had blocked transfers
to the United States. ld.
150. See Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 50 (statement of Jonathan Winer)
("Neither the U.S. nor the EU sought a trade war over privacy.").
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companies had entered the Safe Harbor. 5's A few months later, thirty
firms were on the list.15 By August 2001, industry bellwethers Procter
& Gamble, Microsoft, and Intel had all joined, bringing the total to
somewhat less than 100 companies." 3 More companies glided into the
harbor over the ensuing months, but as of March 2002, only 168 firms
had registered."s
Why have so many companies stayed away? Explanations abound.
Commentators have suggested that American businesses first wanted
to see the consequences of not signing up, particularly as to liability 5
Other theories included the sheer novelty of the deal," the "logistical
challenge of getting up-to-speed,"'  bureaucratic delays," s and a
"reluctance to step into the spotlight." '159 Some companies simply
consider the rules "costly, unworkable and unfair given the failure of
[the European Union] to aggressively enforce data privacy violations
by European organizations."'" And, as always, companies want to be
sure that the benefits of Safe Harbor outweigh the costs. "'
Some in the U.S. government itself seem uncertain of the wisdom
and efficacy of Safe Harbor. On March 8, 2001, the House
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection held
hearings on the Directive and the new Safe Harbor program.'2
151. Margret Johnston, U.S. To Kick Off Series of "Safe Harbor" Briefings,
InfoWorld, Jan. 4, 2001, http:lwvw.infoworld.com/articesfhn/xmlOlOlO4/
010104hnharbor.xml; Declan McCullagh, Safe Harbor Is a Lonely Harbor, Wired
News, Jan. 5,2001, http://vvw.wired.com/newslpoliticsI0,1283,41004,00.htm.
152. Hyman & Covington, supra note 32.
153. See Loomis, supra note 15.
154. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor List, at
http:/web.ita.doc.govlsafeharbor/shlist.nsflwebPageslsafe+harbor+list (last visited
Mar. 11, 2002).
155. See Johnston, supra note 151.
156. Hyman & Covington, supra note 32.
157. Loomis, supra note 15.
158. Ellen Messmer, EU Data-Privacy Laws Bog Dowi U.S. Firms; Bureaucratic
Process Can Delay Application Projects by Months. Network World, Dec. 17, 2001, at
8.
159. Loomis, Safeguards, supra note 91.
160. Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 18, at 158. Additionally, U.S. companies may
not believe European authorities will even have the necessary resources to enforce
the laws. Kuner, supra note 1, at 88.
161. Loomis, Safeguards, supra note 91. Companies also may be concerned that
the Safe Harbor website itself is not secure: In July 2001 the website accidentally
posted privileged information about some of the companies on the Safe Harbor list,
including confidential information such as revenue and employee data. See Patrick
Thibodeau, Safe Harbor Data Security Eyed after Web Site Glitch, ComputerWorld,
July 9, 2001, at http://www.computerworld.comistoryba0,4125,NAV47-ST062076,00.
html.
162. See generally Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11. From Europe, Professor
Stefano RodotA, Chairman of the EU Data Protection Working Party, and Mr. David
Smith, Assistant UK Information Commissioner, appeared to explain and defend the
Directive. From Canada, Denis E. Henry, Vice President of Regulatory Law, Bell
Canada, testified about Canada's new privacy law. David L Aaron, U.S. negotiator
of the Safe Harbor agreement, now with Dorsey & Whitney LLP; Jonathan M. Winer,
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Opinions of the Safe Harbor program were sharply divided among
both the witnesses and committee members. 63 Shortly after the
hearings, a member of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce went so far as
to say that the Commerce Department never had the authority to
negotiate the deal in the first place 64  Rep. Cliff Stearns (R-Fl.)
mentioned the possibility of a full-blown trade war between the
United States and the EU as a result of disagreements over the Safe
Harbor.165 Nevertheless, the Safe Harbor is still with us, despite the
changeover in administrations in January 2001, and observers predict
that it "will eventually catch on," especially when (or if) the European
Union begins to enforce the Directive."6
The agreement gained some momentum (and notoriety) in June
2001, as Microsoft entered the Safe Harbor following its conviction
and fine in Spain. 67 Dun & Bradstreet joined the Safe Harbor
agreement partly because Sweden had cut off a transatlantic data
transfer. 68 Given the history of these sporadic enforcement actions,
many companies may be tempted to ignore the Directive, hoping that
enforcement will be directed only at "egregious cases" and large
companies. 69 On the other hand, smaller companies may be "eager"
to join the Safe Harbor"' for precisely that reason: They gain its
benefits, but the enforcement authorities will not focus on them.
Indeed, the history of privacy protection in the United States is spotty
at best.
Counsel of Alston and Byrd LLP; Barbara Lawler, Customer Privacy Manager for
Hewlett Packard, Inc.; and Professor Joel R. Reidenberg of Fordham University
School of Law appeared on behalf of the United States. Id. at 3. The hearings
provide an excellent introduction to the Directive and the Safe Harbor, and make for
not only informative but also rather entertaining reading.
163. See id.
164. Caron Carlson, U.S. Firms Find No Haven in Safe Harbor-European Union's
Data Privacy Directive Raises "Considerable" Trade Issues, eWeek, Mar. 19, 2001, at
37, http://www.eweek.com/article/0,3658,s=701&a=9794,00.asp.
165. Peronet Despeignes & Deborah Hargreaves, EU-U.S. Clash over Personal
Data: Private Right or Commercial Opportunity?, Financial Times, Mar. 29, 2001, at
14; see also Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 5-6 (statement of the Hon. W. J.
"Billy" Tauzin, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce) ("[Tlhe EU
Privacy Directive could be the imposition of the [sic] one of the largest free trade
barriers ever seen.").
166. Loomis, Safeguards, supra note 91.
167. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
168. Loomis, Safeguards, supra note 91.
169. Despeignes & Hargreaves, supra note 165.
170. HRIS Data Protection, supra note 3, at 3.
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C. Privacy Enforcement in the United States Today
1. Current Federal Privacy Statutes
The United States does not have a unified, "overarching" regime of
privacy protection, but rather a "patchwork" of privacy legislation."'
There are many patches in this privacy quilt. The following statutes
regulate the collection, use, and dissemination of personal
information.
Statutes that apply to the federal government include the Federal
Privacy Act ("FPA"), which limits the ways the federal government
can collect and store the personal information of federal employees.'2
Additionally, the Internal Revenue Service may not disclose
information on income tax returns, and the Census Bureau cannot
disclose certain census data.' 73 The first computer privacy policy was
promulgated by the U.S. Department of Health and Education in
1973.174
There are also numerous privacy statutes that apply to the private
sector. The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970171 extensively regulates
the collection and dissemination of personal data by credit agencies. 76
The Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974'" provides further protection to
consumers, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 197778
restricts the disclosure of sensitive personal data to certain third
parties.179
The "broadest set of privacy rights in any federal statute"'"
appeared with the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.st The
Act gave sweeping privacy rights to cable subscribers regarding the
171. Fromholz, supra note 9, at 471-72; see also Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 18,
at 150 ("The United States has enacted a patchwork of laws protecting personal
information ...."); Blanke, supra note 53, at 65.
172. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). The information the government collects must be (1)
"relevant and necessary;" (2) collected to the extent possible for the data subject; (3)
maintained with "accuracy and completeness;" and (4) kept securely. The FPA also
limits disclosure of this information. See Cate, supra note 48, at 210.
173. Cate, supra note 48, at 211.
174. Reidenberg, supra note 51, at 773.
175. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1994).
176. Credit agencies must "assure maximum possible accuracy" of the information
they collect, provide for a dispute resolution mechanism to deal with errors, and
provide a copy of the credit report to the consumer upon request. See Cate, supra
note 48, at 211-12.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1666.
178. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1692-92o (1994)).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).
180. Cate, supra note 48, at 215.
181. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
551 (1994)).
20021 2795
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
collection, storage, and disclosure of personal data.' Other
legislation includes the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986,183 which provides certain privacy rights to those engaged in
electronic communication (such as by telephone, fax, or e-mail), and
the Video Piracy Act of 1988,185 which grants consumers privacy rights
in the area of videotape rentals. In the 1990s, the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991186 "allow[ed] consumers to opt out
of unsolicited marketing calls" on a case-by-case basis;"8 the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act of 199411 regulated state Departments of
Motor Vehicles in disseminating personal information; 89 and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996191 contained a few provisions
protecting consumer privacy. 191
Two of the most important laws were passed in the late 1990s in
response to concerns about consumer privacy protection. The
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA")' 92 "restricts the
online collection of information about children under 13.'1 " The FTC
later passed a rule, as we shall see, enabling it to enforce COPPA.9 4
The Financial Services Modernization Act 95 (commonly known as
Gramm-Leach-Bliley) was passed on November 12, 1999, and
requires financial service companies to create, post, and enforce a
182. The Act allows the consumer access to his data, and requires the cable
provider to inform the consumer at least once a year of the data it is collecting, with
whom it might be sharing the data, and how long it is being stored. 47 U.S.C. §
551(a)(1) (A)-(E). Additionally, the consumer may win damages for violations. Id. §
551(f); see Cate, supra note 48, at 214.
183. 99 Pub. L. No. 508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
2510-22 (1994)).
184. Cate, supra note 48, at 214.
185. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000). This statute is commonly known as the "Bork Bill,"
after Judge Robert Bork's video rental record was introduced in his contentious
Supreme Court nomination hearings. As a result of the Act, "video rentals are
afforded more federal protection than are medical records." Shaffer, supra note 8, at
25 (quoting Sheri Albert, Smart Cards, Smarter Policy: Medical Records, Privacy and
Health Care Reform 13 (1993)).
186. Pub. L. No. 102-243; 105 Stat. 2394 (1991) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
227 (1994)).
187. Clear, supra note 29, at 998.
188. Pub. L. No. 106-81, 113 Stat. 1286 (1999) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
2721 (2000)). The Act survived a constitutional challenge on Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment grounds in Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), a unanimous opinion
issued by the Supreme Court reversing an earlier judgment of the Fourth Circuit. Id.
189. Shaffer, supra note 8, at 24-25, 25 n.90. The Act was inspired by the stalking
and murder of an actress. See id. at 25. Indeed, most U.S. privacy laws are enacted in
reaction to public scandals, which partially explains their patchwork quality. See id.;
Reidenberg, supra note 51, at 774.
190. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2000).
191. Cate, supra note 48, at 214.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 6501-06 (2000).
193. Cate, supra note 48, at 216.
194. 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2001); see infra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
195. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6801-09 (2000)).
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privacy policy."9 The FTC later issued a rule interpreting Gramm-
Leach-Bliley "broadly" by extending its coverage "to include any
personal information gathered by a financial institution" and again
enabling the agency to use its power to enforce the Act.'
Congress, therefore, has passed legislation giving Americans
privacy protections, but only in certain contexts. In recent years,
however, the push for greater privacy protections has come not from
Congress, but from the FTC.
2. The FTC and Privacy
The FTC has "taken the lead among federal agencies in advocating
greater data privacy protection in the United States."'" The FTC has
sought greater consumer privacy protection in both words and deeds.
a. Words
In recent years, the FTC has given privacy reports to Congress. In
1998, the FTC delivered a report on online privacy.' The report
identified "five core principles of privacy protection" and "fair
information practices."' It also contained the results of a survey by
the FTC on Internet privacy," and concluded that industry self-
regulation was not yet effective .2  The FTC recommended the
passage of legislation to protect the privacy of children.21"
The FTC delivered another report to Congress in the summer of
1999 2 04  In this report, the FTC noted that e-commerce was
"booming" and that the Internet was a "rich source of information
about online customers" as well as for online customers.21 The report
found that online customers were concerned about threats to their
privacy online, and about having their personal data sold to third
196. Boam, supra note 90, at 182.
197. Id.;16 C.F.R. § 313.
198. Shaffer, supra note 8, at 56.
199. See FTC, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (June 1998) [hereinafter
1998 FTC Privacy Report], http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf.
200. Blanke, supra note 53, at 70; 1998 FTC Privacy Report, supra note 199, at 7-
11. The five core principles are as follows: (1) Notice/Awareness, (2)Choice/Consent,
(3) Access/Participation, (4) Integrity/Security, (5) Enforcement/Redress. 1998 FTC
Privacy Report, supra note 199, at 7-11.
201. See 1998 FTC Privacy Report, supra note 199, at 19-38 (examining the online
practices of personal information collection, the frequency of disclosure of such
collection, and the nature of disclosure).
202. See id. at 41 ("To date, however, the Commission has not seen an effective
self-regulatory system emerge.").
203. See id. at 42-43.
204. See FTC, Self-Regulation and Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (July
1999), [hereinafter 1999 FTC Privacy Report], httpJ/www.ftc.gov/os1999199071
privacy99.pdf.
205. Id. at 1-2.
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parties.2 6 It did recognize the existence of industry self-regulation via
"seal programs, '"207 but noted that "[o]nly a small minority of
commercial Web sites" had joined them."°8 The FTC concluded,
however, that legislation mandating greater privacy protection was
"not appropriate at this time. '' 21
The FTC changed that position in its 2000 report to Congress.2
10
The 2000 report contained the FTC's most far-reaching proposals to
date. It began by noting the continuing "exponential" expansion of
"the online consumer marketplace."21' The report delivered the
results of a new online survey, which concluded that "industry efforts
alone have not been sufficient. 212 The FTC instead recommended
federal legislation to "ensure adequate protection of consumer
privacy online, "213 and to implement four "widely-accepted fair
information practices": notice, choice, access, and security.2 4 The
report repeated widespread consumer privacy concerns. Ninety-two
percent of online consumers, according to the FTC's survey, were
concerned "about the misuse of their personal information online." ' 5
In 1999, $2.8 billion in potential online sales were lost due to this lack
of trust.216 And eighty-two percent of online shoppers "agreed that
government should regulate how online companies use personal
information. 2 17  The report examined the collection of personal
information: ninety-seven percent of websites collected at least "an
email address or some other type of personal identifying
information." '  Of the four recommended privacy principles, the
FTC found that only twenty percent of commercial websites followed
even one of them.21 9 The FTC reiterated its power under section 5 of
the FTCA to combat deceptive practices, such as failing to abide by a
stated privacy policy, but conceded that it could not require
companies to adopt privacy policies in the first place." Accordingly,
the FTC proposed federal legislation that "would set forth a basic
level of privacy protection for all visitors" and would provide the FFC
with authority to issue privacy regulations?2 '1
206. See id. at 2.
207. Id. at 9-12.
208. Id. at 12.
209. Id.
210. See 2000 FTC Privacy Report, supra note 20.
211. Id. ati.
212. Id. at ii.
213. Id. at iii.
214. Id. By now these "fair information practices" are familiar to us.
215. Id. at 2.
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 9.
219. Id. at 12.
220. Id. at 33-34.
221. Id. at 36.
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With a new administration, however, came a new agenda. In a
"marked departure from the policy of his predecessor," the new FTC
Chairman, Timothy Muris, announced that the agency would seek to
expand enforcement of existing laws rather than call for new
legislation.' Muris announced what he called "an ambitious,
positive, pro-privacy agenda" that included increasing "resources
devoted to privacy protection by 50 percent. '"' - - "[I]t is too soon to
conclude that we can fashion workable legislation," Muris said. "[W]e
need more law enforcement, not more laws." ' At an address to
Congress the next month, Muris repeated these announcements to the
House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection.' 2  Mudis stated that the FTC was "primarily a law
enforcement agency" which "best carries out its consumer protection
mission" through "aggressive enforcement of the basic laws of
consumer protection."' 6 The FTC staff will conduct "Surf Days," in
which they search the Internet for websites with deceptive practices.m
In addition, the Commission created a new toll-free hotline for
consumer complaints.' Finally, Muris told the Subcommittee that
"[a] majority of the Commission does not support online privacy
legislation." 29 The Commission did, however, "intend[] to increase
substantially the resources dedicated to privacy protection," paying
particular attention to deceptive trade practices, the Safe Harbor, and
COPPA. 0
The FTC, therefore, continues to focus on consumer privacy, but it
is not likely to call again for privacy legislation in the near future,
whether applicable to all web users or Europeans alone.
222. Devin Gensch, Putting Enforcement First, The Recorder, Nov. 7,2001, at 5.
223. Timothy J. Muris, Remarks of FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris at The
Privacy 2001 Conference (Oct. 4, 2001), httpJlwww.ftc.govlspeechesimuris
privispl002.htm.
224. Id. Despite the success of COPPA, Muris gave four reasons why legislation
would not be "workable": 1) it is too "difficult" to draft useful legislation; 2)
commercial online expansion had slowed recently; 3) the costs of such legislation are
not fully understood; and 4) the existing laws are adequate. See id.
225. See Remarks of Timothy J. Muris, Challenges Facing the Federal Trade
Commission (Nov. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Challenges Facing the Federal Trade
Commission), http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearingsl1072001Hearing4O3/
Muris678print.htm.
226. Id. Which "basic laws" he meant, Muris did not say.
227. See id.; see also infra notes 272-89 and accompanying text (giving examples of
COPPA enforcement actions).
228. 1-877-FTC-HELP. See Challenges Facing the Federal Trade Commission,
supra note 225.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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b. Deeds
The FTC has pursued a number of enforcement actions in recent
years in the area of online privacy. Although none of the cases
progressed very far before a settlement was reached, they were all
brought under the theory of deceptive trade practices, in violation of
section 5 of the FTCA. They therefore give us an idea of what an
enforcement action under the Safe Harbor would look like.
"[T]he first FTC case involving [I]nternet privacy" was In re
GeoCities.21  The FTC filed a complaint in 1998 alleging that
GeoCities had engaged in two counts of deceptive practices in
violation of the FTCA122 It charged GeoCities with misrepresenting
"the uses and privacy of the information it collect[ed]" from
consumers-specifically that the website had "sold, rented or
otherwise marketed and disclosed" personal data "to third parties
who have used this information for purposes other than those for
which members have given permission," contrary to an express
promise made (via a stated privacy policy) to consumers.233 The FTC
also charged that GeoCities had made "misrepresentations involving
sponsorship" when it stated that it maintained and collected children's
personal information for an online club,2' when in fact third parties
were collecting and maintaining the personal data.' 3 In both counts,
the FTC alleged that GeoCities was engaging in "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" in violation of section 5 of the FICA.26
The matter was quickly settled. The consent order required
GeoCities to clearly post a privacy notice "telling consumers what
information is being collected and for what purpose, to whom it will
be disclosed, and how consumers can access and remove the
information. " '37  Children's personal data, moreover, must be
collected only with prior parental consent."
In another case involving the collection of personal data from
children, the FTC filed a complaint in 1999 against Liberty Financial
231. Press Release, FTC, Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of
Deceptively Collecting Personal Information in Agency's First Internet Privacy Case:
Commission Establishes Strong Mechanisms for Protecting Consumers' Privacy
Online (Aug. 13, 1998) [hereinafter GeoCities Press Release],
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9808/geocitie.htm.
232. See Complaint, In re GeoCities, http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/geo-cmpl.htm
[hereinafter GeoCities Complaint]. Cease-and-desist orders "are the administrative
equivalent of prohibitory injunctions." Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law § 2.26
(3rd ed. 1991).
233. GeoCities Complaint, supra note 232, 12-16.
234. Id. T 18.
235. Id. 19.
236. Id. 20.
237. GeoCities Press Release, supra note 231; see also Agreement Containing
Consent Order, In re GeoCities, File No. 9823015, § IV [hereinafter GeoCities
Consent Order], http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/geo-ord.htm.
238. See GeoCities Consent Order, supra note 237, § V.
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Companies, Inc., alleging that its Young Investor website "falsely
represented that personal information collected from children in a
survey would be maintained anonymously," when "[iln fact, the
personal information ... was maintained in an identifiable manner." 9
This failure to abide by the stated terms of a privacy policy, the FTC
alleged, violated section 5 of the FTCA.21 As in GeoCities, the
defendant quickly settled. The settlement and consent order
"prohibit[ed] Liberty Financial from making any false statements
about the collection or use of personal information from children." ''
For children under thirteen, parental consent would be required
before any information at all was collected.242
In late 1999, DoubleClick attempted to merge its database of
personal data with Abacus, sparking consumer outrage.-"'
DoubleClick, as of September 2001, had "amassed 100 terabytes of
information and about 100 million consumer profiles,"' and the
combination with Abacus would have "create[d] a super-database
capable of matching users' online activities with their names and
addresses. ' 245 Prompted by several consumer complaints,246 the FTC
opened an investigation into the matter, causing DoubleClick to
abandon the plan in March 2000.27
The FTC next filed suit against ReverseAuction.com, an auction
site that had registered with eBay, promised that it would not use any
personal information of eBay users to send "spam", -12 4 and then did
precisely that.249 This, according to the FTC, was a deceptive trade
practice.-'0 ReverseAuction.com also settled and agreed to a consent
239. Press Release, FTC, Young Investor Website Settles FTC Charges (May 6,
1999) [hereinafter Young Investor Press Release], httpJ/wwv.ftc.govlopal1999i9905/
younginvestor.htm.
240. See Complaint, In re Liberty Financial Companies, Inc-, 1j 10,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9905/lbrtycmp.htm.
241. Young Investor Press Release, supra note 239.
242. Id
243. Neil Roiter, The CPO, Info. Security, Nov. 2001, at 74,
http://www.infosecuritymag.com/articles/november0lindustry-cpo.shtml.
244. John MacDonnell, Exporting Trust. Does E-Commerce Need a Canadian
Privacy Seal of Approval?, 39 Alberta L. Rev. 346, 354 (2001).
245. In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497,505 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
246. See Boam, supra note 90, at 180.
247. See DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 505; Roiter, supra note 243. The FTC
ultimately ended its investigation on January 22, 2001, concluding that DoubleClick
had not merged the two databases and therefore had not engaged in any unfair or
deceptive trade practices. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 506. A federal class-action
lawsuit against DoubleClick was also dismissed with prejudice on March 29, 2001.
DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 526-27.
248. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief 11 8. 15,
FTC v. ReverseAuctioncon, Inc (D.D.C. 2000), http:lwww.ftc.gov/os2000101/
reversecmp.htm.
249. Id. 16.
250. Id The FTC also for the first time alleged that the misrepresentation was an
unfair trade practice. See id. % 17. In a concurring and dissenting statement to the
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order in January 2000.z1 The settlement barred it from engaging in
such conduct in the future, required it to notify all those whom it had
spammed of what it had done, and ordered it to delete all wrongfully
obtained eBay user information.52
Toysmart.com was a "popular" website that sold children's toys,
and also "collected detailed personal information about its visitors"
through its website, including "the names and birthdates of
children."' 3 It had a posted privacy policy stating that any personal
information it collected would "never" be shared with third parties.,
Toysmart.com eventually went bankrupt and tried to sell its database
of customer information as an asset.255 On July 10, 2000, the FTC filed
suit in District Court in Boston to enjoin the sale.u6
Rather than fight the FTC, Toysmart settled eleven days later. 17
The settlement agreement prohibited it from selling its customer list
"as a stand-alone asset. ''128 The agreement did allow, however, the
sale of the information to a buyer "in a related market" that agreed to
"abide by the terms of the Toysmart privacy statement." 9 It was this
provision of the settlement agreement that caused two commissioners
to dissent from the settlement.2 °  Commissioners Anthony and
Swindle believed that the settlement did not do enough "to protect
consumer privacy. '261 As Commissioner Swindle said, "'never' really
means never." 262 TRUSTe, the online seal program, also "objected to
the settlement because it did not sufficiently protect the promise
embodied in the Toysmart privacy statement and Toysmart's
contractual obligation as a participant in the TRUSTe program.""26 In
consent agreement, two Commissioners rejected this theory as not legally colorable;
the deceptive practice theory was enough. See Press Release, FTC, Online Auction
Site Settles FTC Privacy Charges (Jan. 6, 2000) [hereinafter ReverseAuction Press
Release], http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/01/reverse4.htm.
251. See ReverseAuction Press Release, supra note 250.
252. See Stipulated Consent Agreement and Final Order, §§ I, II, III, V, FTC v.
ReverseAuction.com, Inc. (D.D.C. 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/01/
reverseconsent.htm.
253. Press Release, FTC, FTC Announces Settlement With Bankrupt Website,
Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy Violations (July 21, 2000)
[hereinafter Toysmart Settlement Press Release], http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/
toysmart2.htm.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Press Release, FTC, FTC Sues Failed Website, Toysmart.com, for Deceptively
Offering for Sale Personal Information of Website Visitors (July 10, 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart.htm.
257. Toysmart Settlement Press Release, supra note 253.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle in Toysmart.com, Inc.
(July 21, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/toysmartswindlestatement.htm.
263. Walter W. Miller, Jr. & Maureen O'Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy
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what was viewed as a publicity move, The Walt Disney Company
eventually purchased the customer list and destroyed it.2
c. COPPA: The FTC Gets More Muscle
The one large piece of Internet privacy regulation that Congress has
passed is COPPA-the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of
1998.26 COPPA was enacted after "a three-year effort" by the FTC,
culminating in a March 1998 survey of 212 websites aimed at
children.2  Eighty-nine percent of those websites collected personal
data from children, but only twenty-four percent had posted privacy
policies. 27 Furthermore, "only one percent required parental consent
to the collection or disclosure of children's information." '-
COPPA was signed into law on October 21, 1998. The statute
directed the FTC to promulgate regulations -69 that require websites
that collect personal information from children to do the following:
(1) "provide notice.., of what information is collected," how such
information is used, and how it is disclosed to third parties;-7 and (2)
"to obtain verifiable... consent" from the children's parents before
"the collection, use, or disclosure" of the children's personal data."l
The statute also provides for a rule that requires websites to do as
follows: (1) provide parents, at the parents' request, with a
description of the personal data collected from their child;m and (2)
cease collecting or maintaining information about the child if the
parent refuses permission to the website.2 Other rules contemplated
would forbid websites from "conditioning a child's participation in a
game, the offering of a prize, or another activity on the child
disclosing more personal information than is reasonably necessary to
participate in such activity,"274 and would require websites "to protect
the confidentiality, security, and integrity" of the personal data they
collect from children.275
Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card?, 38 Hous. L Rev. 777, 794 (2001) (internal
quotations omitted).
264. See id
265. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2000).
266. Press Release, FTC, New Rule Will Protect Privacy of Children Online (Oct.
20, 1999) [hereinafter COPPA Press Release], http'.lVwww.ftc.govlopa19999910
childfinal.htm.
267. Id
268. Id
269. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1).
270. Id § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i).
271. Id § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii).
272- Id. § 6502(b)(1)(B)(i).
273. Id. § 6502(b)(1)(B)(ii).
274. Id. § 6502(b)(1)(C).
275. Id. § 6502(b)(1)(D).
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COPPA calls on the FTC to enforce the regulations as well.27 6
Violations of the regulations issued by the FTC and proscribed under
COPPA are to be considered unfair and deceptive trade practices. 77
The FTC issued its proposed rule implementing COPPA on April 27,
1999, and the rule became effective on April 21, 2000.278 The final
rule279 implements all of the statutory provisions by requiring the
following: clear posting of a privacy notice, verifiable parental
consent, choice regarding disclosure to third parties, and enforcement
authorization.8
Shortly after the rule went into effect, the FTC began surfing the
Internet and checking children's websites to see if they were
complying with the rule.8 1 About three-fourths of the websites the
FTC visited collected personal data from children; of those, "roughly
half appeared to have substantial compliance problems."'  The FTC
sent these sites a warning e-mail.283
The first enforcement of the COPPA rule came quickly. In its July
2000 complaint against Toysmart.com, the FTC alleged violations of
the COPPA rule, along with deceptive trade practices. 284 Less than a
year later, the FTC went to court again to enforce the rule. The FTC
sued Looksmart Ltd.,285 Monarch Services, Inc. and Girls Life, Inc.,8 6
and Bigmailbox.com, Inc.,' charging them with violations of the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule and with unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in violation of section 5 of the FTCA.28s
Not surprisingly, the websites settled.289 The settlement agreements
provided that each website delete all personal data collected from
276. Id. § 6505(a).
277. Id. § 6502(c).
278. See COPPA Press Release, supra note 266.
279. 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2001).
280. See COPPA Press Release, supra note 266.
281. Press Release, FTC, Web Sites Warned to Comply With Children's Online
Privacy Law (July 17,2000) [hereinafter Web Sites Warned], http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2000/07/coppacompli.htm.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. First Amended Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable
Relief, FTC v. Toysmart.com, L.L.C., 1 16-18, 19-20, Civ. No. 00-11341-RGS (D.
Mass. 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/toysmartcomplaint.htm.
285. See Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunctive, and Other Relief, United States
v. Looksmart Ltd., Civ. 01-606-A (E.D. Va. 2001),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/looksmartcmp.pdf.
286. See Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunctions, and Other Equitable Relief,
United States v. Monarch Services, Inc., AMD 01 CV 1165 (D. Md. 2001),
http:/Iwww.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/girlslifecmp.pdf.
287. See Complaint, United States v. Bigmailbox.com, Inc., Civ. 01-605-A (E.D.
Va. 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04fbigmailboxcmp.pdf.
288. Press Release, FTC, FTC Announces Settlements with Web Sites That
Collected Children's Personal Data Without Parental Permission (Apr. 19, 2001),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/04/girlslife.htm.
289. Id.
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children since COPPA became law .2" The websites were required to
post a privacy policy and a link to the FTC's web page offering
"helpful information about COPPA.- 29' Further, Bigmailbox.com was
barred "from making deceptive claims in its privacy policy."''
Girlslife.com was fined $30,000; Bigmailbox.com and Looksmart Ltd.
were each fined $35,000.293
Recently, the FTC initiated two more actions. In September 2001,
the FTC filed suit against Lisa Frank, Inc., alleging violations of the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule and section 5 of the
FTCA.294  The website's privacy policy made "false or misleading
statements" pertaining to parental consent. '95 Lisa Frank, Inc. settled,
agreed to abide by COPPA in the future, and paid a $30,000
penalty.296 On February 13, 2002, the FTC filed suit against American
Pop Corn Company for violating the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Rule by collecting personal data on its website from
children under thirteen years of age without parental consent. -' The
matter was settled the very next day.29 In the settlement agreement,
American Pop Corn Company agreed not to violate the Rule in the
future and to pay a civil penalty of $10,000.1
d. Gramrn-Leach-Bliley
The Financial Services Modernization Act' (popularly known as
Gramm-Leach-Bliley) was passed on November 12, 1999.11 The Act
"created sweeping deregulation in the financial services industry while
putting in place greater regulation to protect the privacy of
consumers' non-public personal information." - 2 Like COPPA, the
Act required the FTC to promulgate privacy regulations. -3 The FTC
issued the Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Rule in May
2000, implementing the three requirements of the Act's provisions.-'
290. Id.
291. Id.
292- 1I
293. Id
294. See Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunctive. and Other Relief, United States
v. Lisa Frank, Inc. (E.D. Va. 2001), http:lhwwv.ftc.gov/os2001lOflfcmp.pdf.
295. Id- 20.
296. See Press Release, FTC, Web Site Targeting Girls Settles FTC Privacy
Charges (Oct. 2,2001), http:/vvww.ftc.gov/opa/2001/10lisafrank.htm.
297. Press Release, FTC, Popcorn Company Settles FTC Privacy Violation
Charges (Feb. 14,2002), http:/www.ftc.gov/opa/2002102lpopcorn.htm.
298. See id.
299. Id.
300. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09 (2000).
301. See Boam, supra note 90, at 182.
302. Wolf & Hochman, supra note 9, at 10.
303. Id.
304. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues Final Rule on Privacy of Consumer
Financial Information (May 15,2000), http'.Ihwwv.ftc.gov/opa/2000105/glbpressl.htm.
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First, a financial institution must give notice to its customers "about its
privacy policies and practices"-in particular, its practices regarding
the disclosure of personal information to third parties. 5 Second, a
financial institution "must provide its customers with annual notices of
its privacy policies and practices. 3 6 Third, financial institutions must
give customers the ability to "opt out"-to request that their personal
information not be disclosed to third parties." Although the Rule
went into effect on November 13, 2000, the deadline for compliance
was extended to July 1, 2001.308
At first, the Act "created a great deal of confusion among
companies" over the meaning of "financial institution. '39 The Rule
interprets the Act broadly and defines "financial information" as "any
personal information gathered by a financial institution. 310
Nevertheless, the privacy provisions of the Act have not been without
their critics. 31'
"[A]ny privacy policy is meaningless unless it is enforceable. '312
The Safe Harbor relies on the FTC for its enforcement. 13 Whether or
not the FTC has the legal capacity, however, to enforce the Safe
Harbor has been a matter of dispute.
II. CRITICISMS OF THE SAFE HARBOR'S ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISM
This part will examine three criticisms of the proposed FTC
enforcement of the Safe Harbor agreement: (1) that no one knows
what an enforcement action will look like; (2) that the FTC does not
have the resources and expertise to enforce the agreement effectively;
and (3) that the FTC does not have the statutory authority to enforce
the agreement.
First, the mechanism established to enforce the Safe Harbor has
been "criticized both within and outside the United States" as
"loose '314 and "unclear."315 Even a United States Representative has
called the Safe Harbor's legal status "highly questionable. '316  U.S.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Gensch, supra note 222.
310. Boam, supra note 90, at 182.
311. See, e.g., Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 39 (testimony of the Hon.
Edward J. Markey) ("The privacy provisions of that Act are a pathetic joke."); id. at
98 (testimony of Joel R. Reidenberg) ("I think it is nonsense that Gramm-Leach-
Bliley meets the standards contained in the European directive.").
312. Id. (testimony of the Hon. Edolphus Towns).
313. Reidenberg, supra note 19, at 745.
314. Gladstone, supra note 55, at 25.
315. Despeignes & Hargreaves, supra note 165; see also Hyman & Covington,
supra note 32 ("It is unclear at this time how the sanctions will be enforced .... ").
316. Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 6 (statement of W. J. "Billy" Tauzin).
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privacy advocates claim it will be "meaningless" if challenged."' The
European Union Working Party that was established to investigate
the adequacy of other countries' privacy laws described the Safe
Harbor enforcement mechanisms as "very confusing" and "'simply a
series of recommendations which can lead to a fragmented and
uneven implementation.""31  The confusion may arise from the
fundamentally different ways in which Europeans and Americans
view privacy, and in their respective approaches to protecting it. As
previously discussed, the European model of data protection is a top-
down, bureaucratic approach,3 19 while the American model of privacy
protection is a combination of industry self-regulation and a
"patchwork" of federal privacy legislation.)2' It is understandable that
European citizens-as well as their American counterparts-might be
unfamiliar with the sometimes labyrinthine regulatory structure of
federal administrative agencies.
Second, criticism has focused on the role of the FTC itself, instead
of the overall enforcement structure. Specifically, "the FTC was not
created for such a task and does not have the expertise or authority to
effectively monitor or enforce privacy issues on the Internet.
Furthermore, the FTC has many other duties and is thus unable to
commit sufficient resources to the protection of individuals' privacy
on the Internet. 3 21 The question is whether the FTC, which has a
variety of other responsibilities and functions, will be able to act as an
effective watchdog.
Finally, Professor Joel R. Reidenberg has provided the most precise
criticism of the enforcement mechanism. Specifically, he claims that
the "Safe Harbor faces a serious jurisdictional obstacle to its
enforcement .... [T]he underlying legal authority of the FTC to
enforce [the] Safe Harbor is questionable." " Professor Reidenberg
notes that the "stated Congressional purpose" of the FTCA was to
prohibit "unfair and deceptive acts and practices which deceive and
defraud the public generally."'3 The "public," however, means the
American public: the FTCA and its subsequent amendments "at no
317. Johnston, supra note 116.
318. The Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data, Opinion 7/99 on the Level of Data Protection Provided
by the "Safe Harbor" Principles As Published Together with the Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs) and Other Related Documents on 15 and 16 November 1999 by
the U.S. Department of Commerce (Dec. 3, 1999). http'./europa.eu.int/comm/
internal market/endataprot/vpdocs/wp27en.htm. see also Shimanek, supra note 56,
at 458 (noting that the European Parliament considered the agreement "too weak").
319. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 96, 171-97 and accompanying text.
321. Rachel K. Zimmerman, Note, The Way the "Cookies" Chrnible: Internet
Privacy and Data Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 4 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub.
Pol'y 439, 453-54 (2000-01).
322. Reidenberg, supra note 19. at 740.
323. Id. at 741 (internal quotations omitted).
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time contemplated protecting.., foreign consumers." '324 Professor
Reidenberg calls "the assertion" that the FTC has the statutory
authority to bring enforcement actions on behalf of European
consumers "a radical departure from the stated legislative purposes of
the statute.'325
Section 5(a)(1) of the FTCA declares that "unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 326
Section 5(a)(2) then charges the FTC with preventing "persons,
partnerships, or corporations... from using unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce." '327 As discussed above, the FTC's
recent enforcement actions in the area of online privacy have used the
power bestowed by section 5 to prohibit deceptive practices. 26
Specifically, in each case the FTC has alleged that, when a company
provides consumers with a stated privacy policy, and then fails to
abide by the terms of that policy, it is engaging in a deceptive trade
practice.
But what, exactly, is a deceptive trade practice? The FTCA "does
not define 'deception,' thus leaving it to the courts and the FTC to
determine the meaning of that word."329  Indeed, "Congress has
delegated enormous power to the FTC in this field."33  Courts,
additionally, "treat Commission decisions with great deference." 331 In
sum, "it has fallen largely to the FTC to decide what constitutes
deception." 32
In the context of the Safe Harbor, the FTC has defined a deceptive
practice as "a representation, omission or practice that is likely to
mislead reasonable consumers in a material fashion. '333 In the context
of an enforcement action, a company's public statement that it
adheres to the principles of the Safe Harbor is a representation.
Subsequently failing to adhere to them in processing personal data is a
practice, one that is "likely to mislead" in light of the stated privacy
policy. It is arguable that this practice misleads "in a material
fashion," as consumers might be less willing to purchase goods online
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
327. Id. § 45(a)(2).
328. See supra notes 231-52, 281-99 and accompanying text.
329. Jeff Sovem, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 1305, 1321 (2001).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.; see also George et al., supra note 25, at 777 (noting that the FTCA gives
the FTC "comprehensive powers" to prohibit deceptive practices).
333. Letter from Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC, to John Mogg, Director,
European Commission (July 14, 2000) [hereinafter Pitofsky Letter],
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/FTCLETTERFINAL.htm.
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without adequate privacy assurances."' The only criterion in question
is whether such a practice misleads consumers.
What, then, is meant by "consumer"? Again, the FTCA does not
use the term,3 35 the Safe Harbor agreement does not define it, and it is
certainly arguable that the term "consumer" was not meant to cover
citizens of the European Union.31 The question is important because
the Safe Harbor applies only to data collected from European
citizens-participants are under no obligation as far as American
consumers are concerned.
337
Consider the following hypothetical:
Horatio decides to drop out of law school and join the information
technology revolution. He rents a small suite in an office park in
Little Rock, Arkansas, and forms a company called Super Crunchy
Data Crunchers. He leases computer equipment and software, and
hires staff for his data processing operation.
Horatio's good friend, Hamlet, works for a large Danish
corporation, Claudius Corp., where he is in charge of the customer
relations department. A direct-marketing company based in Poland,
Fortinbras Inc., has been contacting him, asking to purchase Claudius
Corp.'s consumer database. Denmark's Directive-compliant data-
protection statute prohibits this, so Hamlet decides to enlist Horatio
and Super Crunchy in a scheme. Super Crunchy will register for the
Safe Harbor, so that it will be presumed to provide adequate
protection, and the transfer of the consumer database from Denmark
to the United States will proceed without hindrance. Super Crunchy
then will process the Danish data, transfer it to Fortinbras Inc., and
split the proceeds with Claudius Corp.
Super Crunchy has no American customers; it does not advertise,
do business, or otherwise have any contact with anyone but Claudius
Corp. and Fortinbras Inc. One of Hamlet's disgruntled business
associates, Ophelia, gets wind of the scheme and notifies the Danish
data-protection authority, which then notifies the FTC. The FTC
334. See, e.g., Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11. at 45 (statement of David L
Aaron) (noting that, in 2000, e-business lost $16 billion in potential sales due to lack
of consumer trust); id. at 26 (testimony of Towns) (citing a Kearny Management
Group survey reporting $6 billion in lost online sales: "[I]nvasive information
requests are blamed for 52 percent of sales that fall apart, followed by reluctance to
enter credit cards, 46 percent."); id. at 26 (testimony of David Smith, Assistant
Commissioner, Office of the UK Information Commissioner) (-Your figures are
supported by a whole range of studies ... .
335. See 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1994).
336. See Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 67 (statement of Joel R.
Reidenberg) ("Congress has yet to specifically authorize the FTC to protect foreign
consumers.").
337. See Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 12 (defining "personal data" and
"personal information" as "data about an identified or identifiable individual that are
within the scope of the Directive, received by a U.S. organization from the European
Union, and recorded in any form").
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wants to bring a section 5 enforcement action against Horatio and
Super Crunchy, but who is the "consumer" in this scenario? There
are no Americans involved, and European consumers are implicated
only at second remove.
Is this a deceptive trade practice-a representation, omission, or
practice that is likely to mislead reasonable consumers in a material
fashion-if the accused company's "consumers" are a Polish
corporation and a Danish corporation complicit in the data processing
scheme? This Note addresses these criticisms in turn, and suggests a
solution to the most troubling one: the FTC's possible lack of
statutory authority to enforce the Safe Harbor agreement.
III. IN DEFENSE OF THE SAFE HARBOR
A. What a Safe Harbor Enforcement Action Will Look Like
It is clear that the FTC will attempt to enforce the Safe Harbor
using section 5 of the FTCA.3 38 The FTCA authorizes the FTC to
issue complaints and cease-and-desist orders to those it finds to be
engaging in a deceptive trade practice.339 If a company violates a final
order, it faces civil fines of up to $11,000 a day.30 Additionally, if the
FTC finds that there is "a widespread pattern" of deceptive practices,
it may issue an administrative rule prohibiting the deceptive practice
involved. 41
Over the past few years, the FTC has built a track record of filing
complaints against websites that violate their stated privacy policies,
COPPA, or both.42 Each of these complaints has alleged a deceptive
trade practice in violation of section 5 . 43 Specifically, the complaints
alleged that the defendants misled consumers by telling them one
thing and then doing another.
Once an organization certifies that it adheres to the Safe Harbor
principles, it is subject to FTC supervision.' It must also clearly
338. See, e.g., FAQ No. 11, supra note 126 ("If the FTC concludes that it has
reason[s] to believe Section 5 has been violated, it may resolve the matter by seeking
an administrative cease and desist order prohibiting the challenged practices or by
filing a complaint in a federal district court, which if successful could result in a
federal court order to same effect.").
339. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b); Safe Harbor Enforcement Overview, supra note 138.
340. 15 U.S.C. § 45(0; Safe Harbor Enforcement Overview, supra note 138.
341. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(b)(3)(B); Safe Harbor Enforcement Overview, supra note
138. Anyone who knowingly violates an FTC rule is also subject to a fine of up to
$11,000 a day. Id.
342. See supra notes 231-64,281-99 and accompanying text.
343. In its action against ReverseAuction.com, the FTC also alleged unfair acts or
practices, but this legal theory was not fully supported by the FTC, and was dropped
in subsequent actions. See supra text accompanying notes 233-36.
344. This is simply because a company that publicly declares that it follows the Safe
Harbor principles, but fails to do so, is engaging in a deceptive trade practice. See
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signify in its privacy statement (if it does not have a privacy statement,
it must create one) that it adheres to the principles. -5 If the
organization then fails to do so, it is making misrepresentations to
consumers just as GeoCities, u Liberty Financial Companies,
ReverseAuction.com,3 Toysmart.com, - 9  Looksmart and
Girlslife.com,350  Lisa Frank,'5 and the American Pop Corn
Company32 were making misrepresentations to their consumers.
Lack of adherence to the Safe Harbor is just as much a deceptive
practice and actionable under section 5 as those companies' practices
were.
So far, so good. But all the cases begun by the FTC settled
quickly-within a day, in one case. 3  We do not know for sure
whether this is because the law is clearly on the FTC's side, or because
penniless dot-coins chose not to fight one of the most powerful
regulatory agencies of the federal government, or because they
wanted simply to avoid negative publicity (particularly, one would
think, in the case of COPPA violations). Or perhaps the companies
involved simply did not know that they were breaking the law.
Perhaps the result would be different if an industry giant like
Microsoft or Intel chose to fight the FTC in court.-' But for now, it is
clear how the FTC would go about punishing violations of the Safe
Harbor: by filing a complaint charging a deceptive trade practice,
then seeking injunctive relief through a cease-and-desist order, which
would then be followed by a final agreement and perhaps a fine for
willful violations.355
Pitofsky Letter, supra note 333 ("[I1f a web site falsely claims to comply with a stated
privacy policy ... Section 5 of the FTC Act provides a legal basis for challenging such
a misrepresentation as deceptive.").
345. See Safe Harbor Enforcement Overview, supra note 138.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 231-38.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 239-42.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 248-52.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 253-64.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 285-93.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 294-96.
352 See supra text accompanying notes 297-99.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 237, 241, 251,257. 289, 296, 298.
354. With the availability of more funds for enforcement actions, see supra note 223
and accompanying text, the FTC will not have to focus solely on "extreme" cases.
Gensch, supra note 222, at 5.
355. See generally notes 231-64 and accompanying text (describing past FTC
privacy enforcement actions).
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B. Can the FTC Act as an Effective Watchdog?
1. The FTC Was Created for Such a Task
The FTC was created to be a consumer-protection agency. The
FTC has two missions: to enforce the antitrust laws and to provide
consumer protection. 6  The FTCA was passed in 1914 to protect
consumers from unfair competition. 7  The FTC's consumer
protection authority was expanded by Congress in 1938 and again in
1975.358
Moreover, the FTC has shown a consistent willingness both to call
for greater privacy protection for consumers 359 and to enforce privacy
rights in the courts.36  The FTC has presented special reports
concerning online privacy to Congress, was instrumental in getting a
major privacy statute (COPPA) enacted, 62 and has called for further
legislation to protect consumers.363
2. The FTC Does Have the Expertise or Authority to Effectively
Monitor or Enforce the Safe Harbor
So far, only 168 firms have joined the Safe Harbor364-it cannot be
that hard to monitor them. The FTC relies on referrals from
consumers themselves as well as their own investigative activities.
Consumers can complain to the FTC directly via a form on their
website365 or their toll-free hotline 6.3  Additionally, participants in the
356. See FTC, Vision, Mission & Goals, at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/mission.htm (last
modified June 17, 1999).
357. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2001).
358. Reidenberg, supra note 19, at 740-41.
359. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
360. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
361. See supra notes 199-230 and accompanying text.
362. See COPPA Press Release, supra note 266 ("The COPPA was enacted
following a three-year effort by the Commission .... The Commission recommended
that Congress enact legislation concerning children .... ); see also Press Release,
FTC, FTC Releases Report on Consumers' Online Privacy (June 4, 1998),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9806/privacy2.htm (summarizing the 1998 FTC Privacy
Report and listing "Recommendations for Protecting Children's Privacy Online" that
later were included in COPPA).
363. See supra text accompanying note 221.
364. See supra text accompanying note 154.
365. See Federal Trade Commission Consumer Complaint Form, OMB #3084-
0047, at http://www.ftc.gov/dod/wsolcq$.startup?ZORGCODE=PU01 (last visited
Mar. 20, 2002). Consumers may also forward unsolicited e-mail (spam) to the e-
mailbox UCE@ftc.gov. Id.
366. Challenges Facing The Federal Trade Commission, supra note 225. The FTC
took action against DoubleClick, see supra notes 243-47, after receiving several such
complaints. See Boam, supra note 90, at 180. Through its toll-free number and its
website, the FTC "receives over 10,000 consumer complaints about fraudulent and
deceptive business practices each week." FTC, Privacy Agenda (Oct. 4, 2001)
[hereinafter Privacy Agenda], http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/l10/privacyagenda.htm.
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Safe Harbor will be subject to "spot checks" by European data-
protection authorities, who will then refer violations to the FTC.-7
As for enforcement expertise, the FTC has brought approximately
100 privacy actions so far.3 It should also be noted that there are no
other federal agencies that have the FTC's extensive experience with
consumer protection and deceptive trade practices or that focus on
enforcing the privacy rights of consumers. For now, the FTC is the
only game in town.369
3. The FTC Is Able to Commit Sufficient Resources to Enforce the
Safe Harbor
Again, there are only 168 companies in the Safe Harbor so far-not
a number that requires an extraordinary commitment of resources,
particularly when EU authorities and consumers also play their
parts.3 0 Additionally, the privacy actions the FTC has undertaken to
date settle very quickly."' Although the new chairman, Timothy J.
Muris, has backed off from his predecessor's call for federal
legislation,3 2 he has proposed that the resources dedicated to
enforcing existing rules-including the Safe Harbor-be increased by
fifty percent.3' In its 2002 Privacy Agenda, the FTC specifically
promised "[n]ew efforts [to] focus on cases involving... the failure of
companies to meet commitments made under the European Union
Safe Harbor program to provide privacy protections."3 4 Indeed, the
FTC has promised to enforce Safe Harbor violations on a priority
basis.375
Finally, FTC actions would have a deterrent effect, and most
companies will be easily persuaded to follow the Safe Harbor
requirements than risk the wrath of a full regulatory battle-and all
the ensuing publicity. "Companies do heed the words of the FTC and
do respond to problems the FTC identifies through its enforcement
actions." '376 As one commentator put it, being subject to a FTC
section 5 action is "like facing a nuclear bomb in a food fight."3'
367. Messmer, supra note 158, at 8.
368. George et al., supra note 25, at 748 n.56.
369. See Sovem, supra note 329, at 1321 ("[O]nly the FTC itself can enforce the
FTC Act" upon which the Safe Harbor is based).
370. See supra notes 364-67 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 353.
372. See supra text accompanying note 224.
373. See Muris, supra note 223; supra text accompanying note 223.
374. Privacy Agenda, supra note 366.
375. Muris, supra note 223: see also Sykes & de Bony, supra note 114 ("The safe
harbor principles also mandate that the [FTC] expedite complaints by EU citizens
about how their data was handled in the United States, processing them faster than
complaints from U.S. citizens ...."); Pitofsky Letter, supra note 333.
376. Gensch, supra note 222; see also Gladstone, supra note 55, at 28 ("Upon the
recommendation of the FTC many web sites now publish their privacy policies ...
377. Gensch, supra note 222.
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C. Whether the FTC Has Statutory Authority to Enforce the Safe
Harbor Agreement
1. "Consumer"
As discussed above, the FTC has defined a deceptive trade practice
as a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead
reasonable consumers in a material fashion.378  But what is a
consumer? The FTCA does not define the term; neither does the Safe
Harbor agreement itself. The Safe Harbor, however, does offer the
following definition: "[p]ersonal data" and "personal information"
are data about an identified or identifiable individual that are within
the scope of the Directive, received by a U.S. organization from the
European Union, and recorded "in any form."379 Therefore, the Safe
Harbor's provisions apply only to data that has been transferred from
the EU-that is, the personal data of European consumers.
All the FTC's privacy cases380 have been against domestic
companies. The FTC, for its part, insists that it can act on behalf of
foreign consumers.38 1  As an example, the FTC cites its 1998
enforcement action against Fortuna Alliance, the operator of a
worldwide pyramid scheme.38z The FTC filed a complaint against the
website, charging unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation
of section 5-in particular, the promise made to consumers of
fabulous returns on their "investment. ' 3 3 A settlement was reached,
whereby the website agreed to pay refunds to 15,622 customers in the
United States and seventy foreign countries. 38  Over half of the
scam's victims, however, were U.S. citizens, and more than half of the
378. Pitofsky Letter, supra note 333.
379. Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 12 (emphasis added).
380. See supra notes 231-99 and accompanying text.
381. See Pitofsky Letter, supra note 333 ("In the past, the Federal Trade
Commission has provided redress for citizens of both the United States and other
countries. The FTC will continue to assert its authority, in appropriate cases, to
provide redress to citizens of other countries who have been injured by deceptive
practices under its jurisdiction." (footnote omitted)).
382. Press Release, FTC, $5.5 Million in Refunds to Victims of Fortuna Alliance
Pyramid: Court Order Could Recover $2.2 Million More From Internet Scam
Promoters (July 22, 1998) [hereinafter Fortuna Press Release],
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9807/fortunar.htm.
383. Complaint, FTC v. Fortuna Alliance, L.L.C. et al. (W.D. Wash. 1996), $9T 19-
22, http://www.ftc.gov/ro/fortuna/fortcom4.htm. The website had "promise[d]
consumers that they ... [would] earn a profit of at least $5,000 per month for a $250
initial investment." Id. 14.
384. Fortuna Press Release, supra note 382; see also FTC, FTC Refund Program
for Fortuna Alliance (listing countries, the total number of consumers defrauded, and
the amount of various refunds paid), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9807/ftcrefund01.
htm. Sharp FTC watchers may notice that the list includes such "countries" as
"Gibralter," Puerto Rico, Scotland, and Wales. Id.
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refund money went to them.' Moreover, the FTC may not have
been able to bring the foreign refunds to pass without outside help.31
In our hypothetical, would the FTC be able to punish Super
Crunchy for lying to them and cheating on the Safe Harbor? Under
the definition of deceptive trade practice the FTC has adopted,' it is
doubtful. Under that definition, whether or not a company's behavior
is a deceptive trade practice-and, therefore, whether or not the FTC
has jurisdiction to bring an enforcement action-hinges on the term
"consumer." In the hypothetical, Super Crunchy Data Crunchers is
the Safe Harbor participant, and its only consumer is Fortinbras Inc.,
a foreign company. The FTC would be on shaky ground if it
attempted to bring an enforcement action based on the current
definition of "deceptive trade practice," for Fortinbras Inc. arguably
does not fall within the definition of the "public." -
2. Rulemaking Under the FTCA
The FTC has rulemaking power under the FTCA to define what it
considers a deceptive or unfair trade practice.-" There must be a
"widespread pattern" of deceptive practices, or the FTC must have
already issued cease-and-desist orders in like cases, before a rule may
be promulgated.3"
The FTC has used its rulemaking authority in the past to prohibit
industry conduct that no one had previously thought of as deceptive.39'
The FTC wields "such broad discretion in defining deceptive and
unfair conduct that if the FTC could produce colorable arguments
that the [industry conduct] violate[s] the FTC Act, it is very likely that
courts would sustain that judgment."3 For example, the rule that the
FTC issued to enforce COPPA simply states that "a violation of [the
Commission's rules implementing COPPA] shall be treated as... an
385. See FTC Refund Program for Fortuna Alliance, supra note 384. U.S. citizens
comprised 8894 of the 15,625 victims, and received $3,175,801 out of the total of
$5,501,127 paid. Id.
386. See Fortuna Press Release, supra note 382 ("The FTC used counsel in
London, Belize, and Antigua for foreign litigation freezing defendants' offshore bank
accounts. The Department of Justice's Office of Foreign Litigation was instrumental
in reaching settlement of the foreign actions.").
387. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
38& See supra notes 323-24 and accompanying text.
389. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a) (1994); Sovern, supra note 329, at 1322.
390. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(3).
391. See, eg., Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.
1973). The D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by J. Skelly Wright, reversed a lower court
ruling that the FTC did not have the authority under the FTCA to issue rules and
regulations having the substantive force of law. Id. at 697-98. The FTC had issued a
rule declaring the failure to post octane ratings on a gasoline pump a deceptive act or
practice "without the necessity of further proof." Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v.
FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
392. Sovern, supra note 329, at 1322.
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unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under section
18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. ''393
The privacy rule passed by the FTC to enforce COPPA operates on
a deceptive-practice theory.394 The Children's Online Privacy Rule
does not use the term "consumer," but rather "child. '395 The Rule
defines "child" simply as "an individual under the age of 13. 1396 The
jurisdiction of the FTC is not limited by national boundaries-indeed,
"operator" is defined as "any person who operates a website located
on the Internet" that collects personal data from children "involving
commerce" between the states or with foreign countries. 3 7 Following
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the Privacy of Consumer Financial Information
Rule defines "consumer" as "an individual who obtains or has
obtained a financial product or service. '398 Again, no reference is
made to "U.S. consumers" or other jurisdictional boundaries, and one
would assume that Congress did not intend to exclude foreign
nationals with assets in American financial institutions from the
protections of the Act. In both Acts, who the consumer or child is,
and where they reside, are beside the point. The issue simply is
whether that person has been a victim of a deceptive practice.
Therefore, the FTC should promulgate a rule declaring that, a
company misrepresenting to its consumers that it follows the
principles of the Safe Harbor agreement while not actually doing so is
a deceptive trade practice under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. As with COPPA and Gramm-Leach-Bliley,
such a rule would apply to any participating company, regardless of
who is the "consumer." In doing so, the FTC would benefit from not
only the National Petroleum Refiners decision,399 but also from judicial
deference under the Chevron Doctrine. Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council,4" the FTC's definition of
"deceptive trade practice" would stand if it is "a permissible
construction of the statute. 4 °1
COPPA and Gramm-Leach-Bliley are statutory mandates that
specifically direct the FTC to create rules to enforce their provision.
393. Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.9 (2001).
394. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
395. 16 C.F.R. § 312.2.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. § 313.3(e)(1).
399. See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
400. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
401. See id. at 843-44. The Court stated:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.
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The FTC has argued that the reason the statutes were passed in the
first place is to require all websites and financial institutions to create
and abide by privacy policies, something that was not possible by
using its rulemaking power alone. Under the Safe Harbor,
participation is voluntary, and all those who have signed on have
agreed to abide by its principles. No statute is needed to give the FTC
jurisdiction over cheaters and liars; the companies in the Safe Harbor
are all American.
Nevertheless, the FTC's current definition of "deceptive trade
practice," and the uncertainty of the term "consumer," make FTC
enforcement of the Safe Harbor vulnerable to judicial attacks. The
surest answer to the problem, of course, is for Congress to pass a
statute declaring that cheating on the Safe Harbor constitutes a
deceptive trade practice, and granting the FTC authority to issue rules
to that effect, pursuant to its power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations.4°3 Given Congress's past failure to enact a broad privacy
statute, and given the new FTC Chairman's focus on more
enforcement, not more legislation, this should not be expected in
the near future. But, it remains the only available way to fully
eliminate the doubts of the European Union-and American privacy
advocates-as to whether the Safe Harbor can be effectively enforced.
CONCLUSION
The remaining criticism, not fully treated in this Note, of the Safe
Harbor and the European Directive is that it will cost American
business-and therefore, American consumers-money. 'O Its
requirements, however, are not all that burdensome. Under COPPA,
websites that collect personal data already have to operate under an
entirely different set of rules for an entire segment of the
population-children under thirteen.' In practice, COPPA has not
proven to be unworkable. Compliance with the Safe Harbor is not all
that costly, either. Microsoft, by its own estimate, spent $500,000 to
become compliant after its Spanish imbroglio.' While that sum could
pay for the education of six or seven new lawyers, it is hardly going to
hurl Microsoft (or most of the other companies on the Safe Harbor
list) into bankruptcy. Finally, the companies that are on that list are
40Z See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
403. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
404. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
405. See supra note 29.
406. Under the GeoCities Consent Agreement, GeoCities would "collect certain
'limited screening information' from customers attempting to register at the site for
the purpose of identifying and blocking children 12 and under from registering
without their parent's permission." Geocities Press Release, supra note 231. If a
website can "screen" children during registration, it is not far-fetched to propose that
it also can screen EU citizens.
407. Loomis, supra note 15.
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there because they signed up. If a company thinks the terms are too
onerous, and FTC oversight too harsh, they may withdraw from the
Safe Harbor and bet that the European regulatory authorities will be
lax in their enforcement.408 You pays your money and you makes
your choice.
The Safe Harbor is a rather unusual agreement; it provides priority
federal enforcement of the rights of foreign citizens-rights that
United States citizens do not have. One commentator has argued that
enforcing the Safe Harbor will create "a vast legal chasm" and "a
double standard" that "might be legal" but "makes for exceptionally
poor public policy." 4° Perhaps. But the fact remains that the Safe
Harbor, however else it may be characterized, is one more piece in the
federal privacy patchwork. And when it is demonstrated once again
that privacy standards can be adopted and enforced without
bankrupting the online marketplace, the privacy cause in the United
States will be advanced another step. The EU, for its part, realizes
that the Directive is somewhat draconian, and some predict that it will
"soften it" in the enforcement process.41 On the other hand, the EU's
enforcement of the Directive has already been described as "lax,"
while "the U.S. systematically enforces its privacy laws." '1 There
probably will be plenty of adjustments on both sides in the short term
to come to an agreement both sides can live with. The long-term
industry trend, however, is "toward more enforcement and more
compliance. 41 The Safe Harbor agreement is a good place to start.413
408. See Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 18, at 151.
409. Clear, supra note 29, at 1017.
410. Loomis, Safeguards, supra note 91.
411. Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 46 (statement of Jonathan M. Winer).
412. Loomis, Safeguards, supra note 91.
413. See, e.g., Safe Harbor Hearings, supra note 11, at 80 (statement of Barbara
Lawler, Customer Privacy Manager, Hewlett-Packard Company) ("Joining the Safe
Harbor is the next logical step in [Hewlett-Packard's] commitment to privacy
protection.").
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